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Turkey's foreign policy 
implementation in sub-





Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued 
that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take 
part in Turkeys Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interac-
tion in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted 
for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper 
combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation 
in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We 
argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government 
has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing 
its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state 
actors. 
Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-Africa relations, sub-Saharan Af-
rica, post-internationalism, foreign policy implementation. 
Introduction 
T h e concept of foreign policy has t radi t ional ly been u n d e r s t o o d in s ta te -
centr ic t e r m s a n d has been equa t ed to ac t ions a n d decis ions by official 
decision m a k e r s . 1 W i t h t h e advent of g lobal izat ion, t h e s t a t e -cen t r i sm 
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1 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited) (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Valerie M. Hudson "The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analy-
sis," in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-specif-
ic Theory and the Ground of International Relations," Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005); Christo-
pher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 49 (2013): 121-156. 
122 Volkan Ipek and Conca Biltekin 
£ of classical and behavioralist foreign policy analysis (FPA) has met with 
=> considerable challenge.2 The increasing effect of non-state actors has 
z been incorporated into FPA by focusing on the contributions and chal-
£ lenges to governments' decision-making processes by business groups, 
p ethnic groups, political oppositions, public opinion, and the media.3 
£ More broadly, studies on transnationalism, interdependence, and global 
* governance have all provided a bigger picture about how foreign policy 
s decisions are made with the involvement of non-state actors, 
z Despite the above developments, FPA has remained a field which 
almost exclusively focuses on the decision.5 In other words, theories of 
foreign policy are mostly concerned with why official decision makers 
take one specific decision instead of others. The decision-making pro-
cess is thus highlighted at the expense of foreign policy implementation. 
Moreover, FPA literature has mostly overlooked the changes brought by 
globalization and the increasing importance of transnationalization in 
foreign policy implementation.7 Whenever input from non-state actors 
are considered, their effects on foreign policy have mostly been analyzed 
in terms of their discursive actions aimed at influencing official foreign 
policy decisions in the form of agenda-setting, framing, lobbying, or 
norm-building. 
2 Steve Smith, "Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview," Review of International Studies 12, 
no. i (1986): 13. 
3 See, Douglas Foyle, "Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization: Public Opinion, World Opinion, and 
the Individual," International Studies Review 5, no. 2 (June, 2003); Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: 
Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" Review of International Studies 25, no. 2 (1999); Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," 
World Politics 43 (1991); Ole R. Holsti et al., "Of Rifts and Drifts: A Symposium on Beliefs, Opinions, 
and American Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (1986); Ole R. Holsti, "Public 
Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lipmann Consensus," International Studies 
Quarterly 36, no. 4 (1992); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Is It Love or the Lobby? Ex-
plaining America's Special Relationship with Israel," Security Studies 18, no. 1 (2009). 
4 Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks." Foreign Policy 
(1999); Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 127; Riva Krut, Glo-
balization and Civil Society: NCO Influence in International Decision-making (Geneva: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, 1997). 
5 Steve Smith and Michael Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy Behaviour," in 
Foreign Policy Implementation, ed. Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1985). 4-
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Rainer Baumann and Frank A. Stengel, "Globalization and Foreign Policy Analysis: Neglect of or Suc-
cessful Adaptation to Changing Political Practices?" Paper presented at the 51st Annual Convention of 
the International Studies Association in New Orleans, LA, February 17-20, 2010. 
8 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," Inter-
national Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917; Steve Chamovitz, "Two Centuries of Participation: 
NGOs and International Governance," Michigan Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (1997): 281-282; 
Anna Holzscheiter, "Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance," Mil-
lennium Journal of International Studies 33 (2005): 723; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists 
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z O n the other hand, non-state actors' participation in foreign policy j 
can also be analyzed in terms of their interaction with the formal state 
actors and agencies involved in the implementation process, where non-
state actors take on operational responsibilities. There is a growing em-
pirical literature about how formal foreign policy makers rely on and 
work with non-state actors in implementing foreign policy. Issues range 
from hiring private security companies to wage war to hiring private 
consultants to promote democracy abroad. In some cases, involvement 
of non-state actors has been so overwhelming that formal policy makers 
have been unable to implement a strategic framework due to "ad hoc and 
incoherent proliferation of actors and policy perspectives." 
With respect to Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa, there has 
been a similar focus on decision making to explain why the Turkish gov-
ernment has decided to intensify its relations with African states. This 
literature, although small, generally explains the interest of the Turkish 
government in sub-Saharan Africa with reference to globalization and 
its EU membership process and the ensuing domestic pressure either 
from business groups to diversify their export markets or from peripher-
al "religious and nationalistic groups" to take action more independently 
from Western institutions.11 With respect to Africa, it has been argued 
that the Turkish government relies on "Turkish people's kinship to fel-
low Muslims." Another explanation focuses on formal policy makers' 
perceptions and the introduction of a new vision for a multidimensional 
foreign policy. More often than not, the significant involvement of 
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
9 Carol C. Adelman, "The Privatization of Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6, (2003): 9-14; Virginia 
Haufler, "International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention," International Studies 
Perspectives 5, no. 2 (2004); Brian Hocking, "Privatizing Diplomacy?" International Studies Perspec-
tives 5, no. 2 (2004); Klaus Dieter Wolf, Nicole Deitelhoff, and Stefan Engert, "Corporate Security Re-
sponsibility: Towards a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda," Cooperation and 
Conflict 42, no. 3 (2007); Lawrence Davidson, Foreign Policy Inc. Privatizing America's National Interest 
(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2009); Lawrence Davidson, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," Mid-
dle East Policy 13, no. 2 (2006); Michael A. Cohen and Maria Figueroa Ktipcu, "Privatizing Foreign 
Policy," World Policy Journal 22, no. 3 (2005); Shaun Breslin, "Beyond Diplomacy? UK Relations with 
China since 1997," British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6, no. 3 (2004); Teresa La Porte, 
"The Impact of 'Intermestic' Non-State Actors on the Conceptual Framework of Public Diplomacy," 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7, no. 4 (2012); Ekaterina Balabanova, "Media and Foreign Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe post 9/11: In from the Cold?" Media, War of Conflict 4, no. 1 (2011). 
10 David Chandler, "The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign Policy',"Journal of 
International Relations and Development 1 o, no. 4 (2007). 
11 Birol Akgun and Mehmet Ozkan, "Turkey's Opening to Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies 
48, no. 4 (2010). 
12 Tom Wheeler, "Ankara to Africa: Turkey's Outreach since 2005," South African Journal of International 
Affairs 18, no. 1 (2011). 
13 Mehmet Ozkan. "Turkey's 'New' Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications," 
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£ non-state actors in Turkeys opening to Africa is highlighted, and it is 
=> argued that there is a "smooth convergence of both governmental and 
* business policies."14 
2 Nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often portrayed 
p in the form of foreign policy output, e.g., the level of trade, or the amount 
£ of developmental and humanitarian aid from civil society.1 Such stud-
2 ies usually lack a comprehensive theoretical framework to conceptually 
3 account for the interaction patterns among different actors involved in 
z the implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy on sub-Saharan Africa. 
An implementation perspective, which explicates how Turkey has im-
plemented its decision to open up to Africa, may lead to a conceptually 
informed discussion of the nature of the relationship between non-state 
actors and the government during the implementation process. 
This article builds upon and integrates two theoretical approaches 
which have been developed independently from each other and have 
rarely been brought together: a foreign policy implementation approach 
and post-internationalism. Looking from a post-international perspec-
tive, we argue that there is "an apparent trend in which more and more 
of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct 
involvement of nations and states."16 In this multi-centered world, the 
ultimate resort for realizing goals has become the withholding of co-
operation or compliance rather than military force. Implementation 
studies also posit that foreign policy is implemented by coalitions, which 
have to be maintained over time.18Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy 
towards sub-Saharan Africa has been implemented with varying de-
grees and types of cooperation with non-state entities in a multitude of 
spheres. We differentiate these interactions into three categories: Coop-
erative, complementary and supplementary. 
The article consists of four parts. In the following part, we provide a 
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2011). 
14 Mehmet Ozkan, "A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey's Engagement with 
Africa," Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, no. 1 (2012): 129; Akgiin and Ozkan, "Turkey's 
Opening," 542-543. 
15 Mehmet Ozkan, "What Drives Turkey's Involvement in Africa?" Review of African Political Economy 
37, no. 126 (2010); Mehmet Ozkan, "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa," Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 
(2010); Ozkan, "Turkey's 'New' Engagements"; Akgiin and Ozkan, "Turkey's Opening,"; Ozkan, "New 
Actor"; Wheeler, "Ankara to Africa." 
^6 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1990), 6; James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Gov-
ernance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 38; James N. Rosenau, 
"Beyond Postinternationalism," in Pondering Postinternationalism, ed. Heidi H. Hobbs (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2000). 
17 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 250. 
18 Smith and Clarke, eds., Foreign Policy Implementation (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 171. 
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brief history of Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan African countries. m 
Most of these interactions were state-centric with minimal involvement •» 
m 
from sovereignty-free actors (SFAs). In the second part, we provide a £ 
more detailed account of what implementation studies and post-interna- n 
tionalism can offer for the study of foreign policy in general and Turkey's < 
sub-Saharan African foreign policy in particular. In the third part, we £ 
analyze four patterns of interaction between sovereignty-bound actors * 
(SBAs) and SFAs in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy to- » 
ward sub-Saharan Africa; cooperative, complementary, supplementary, < 
and conflictual. Lastly, we conclude with some comments about Turkey's 
prospects in sub-Saharan Africa in light of these interaction patterns. 
Sub-Saharan Africa in Turkish foreign policy: A history 
During the Second World War and the Cold War, international circum-
stances and Turkey's domestic social, economic, and political problems 
limited Turkey's outreach to non-Western societies.19 Nonetheless, 
Turkish foreign policy did witness brief attempts at a more proactive 
and multidimensional foreign policy and relative increases in Turkey's 
relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Since the Cold War, along with the 
newly independent states of Former Soviet Union and the Middle East-
ern countries, Africa has emerged as a new focus of interest for Turkish 
foreign policy. 
Until the end of the Second World War, Turkey's relations with 
sub-Saharan Africa were based on establishing limited diplomatic con-
tacts. Even though the anti-imperialistic character of the Turkish War 
of Liberation had triggered sympathetic longings for independence in 
sub-Saharan African communities, bilateral relations with sub-Saharan 
Africa could not move beyond that point. In this period, Ethiopia was 
the first and only sub-Saharan African state in which Turkey opened an 
embassy.21 
Turkey's membership of the United Nations ( U N ) in 1946 and its 
entry into the Nor th Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) in 1952 
were key events with respect to its relations with African countries. Tur-
key's pro-British stance in Cyprus and the Suez Crisis and its disbelief in 
the effectiveness of neutrality in the face of Soviet expansionism, led to 
diplomatic tensions between Turkey and the African states of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The pro-Western attitude Turkey displayed in the 
1955 Bandung Conference caused further tension between the sides. 
19 Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (New York: Nova Publishers, 2004). 
20 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, 39th ed. (Istanbul: Ktire, 2009), 207. 
21 The Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa was opened in 1926. 
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£ Moreover, Turkey's failure to support Algeria's independence in the U N 
= General Assembly in 19562 2 dealt a serious blow to Turkish-African 
z relations.2 Nevertheless, this period also witnessed a number of posi-
12 tive developments with respect to Turkey-sub-Saharan Africa relations. 
j : Turkey supported the U N General Assembly decision to send economic 
£ assistance to the Sahel region in 1948.2 4 Turkey also opened a General 
« Consulate in Nigeria in 1956,25 and an Embassy in Ghana in 1957.26 
3 From the mid-1960s onwards, as Turkey-US relations deteriorated 
z due to the Cyprus issue, Turkey tried to redress its poor relations with 
the non-Western world.27 This period also coincided with decoloniza-
tion across the African continent. Turkey recognized newly independent 
countries and attempted to develop economic, cultural, and political re-
lations with them.2 8 Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie visited Turkey 
in March 1967, and Turkish President Cevdet Sunay visited Ethiopia in 
December 1969. 
In the 1970s, relations between Turkey and the US deteriorated still 
further due to US pressure on poppy cultivation in Turkey, Turkey's Cy-
prus intervention, and the subsequent US arms embargo, which acceler-
ated the diversification of Turkey's foreign relations. Turkey designed an 
Action Plan and established a new administrative system in the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to implement these multifaceted foreign 
policy objectives.29 One crucial element was the creation of regional 
desks, one of which was assigned to sub-Saharan Africa. In November 
1971, Ethiopian Emperor Selassie paid his second visit to Turkey. The 
1976 opening of Turkey's Embassy in Kinshasa (Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo), the medical assistance package sent to Zimbabwe in 
1978, and the Economic and Technical Cooperation ( T E T ) agreement 
22 Meliha Altunisik, "Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in "Special Issue on 
Turkish Foreign Policy," ed. Mustafa Aydin and Kemal Kirisci, special issue, New Perspectives on Turkey 
40 (Spring 2009): 174. 
23 Mehmet Ozkan, "Turkiye'nin Afrika Acilimi ve Asya ile iliskiler," in Turkiye'de Dis Politika, ed. ibrahim 
Kalin (Istanbul: Meydan Yayincilik, 2011), 121. 
24 The Sahel region corresponds to the northern region of present-day Burkina Faso. Feridun C. Erkin, 
"Turkey's Foreign Policy," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 24, no. 4 (1952): 128. 
25 Salih Zeki Karaca, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond: Her Opening Up Policy to 
Africa," Dis Politika 25, no. 3-4 (2000): 116. 
26 Numan Hazar, "The Future of Turkey-Africa Relations," Dis Politika 25, no. 3-4 (2000): no . 
27 Mustafa Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjectures During 
the Cold War," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 1 (2000): 130. 
28 Over the next five years, Turkey opened embassies in Lagos (Nigeria) in i960, in Dakar (Senegal) in 
1962, and in Nairobi (Kenya) in 1968. Numan Hazar, Kuresellesme Surecinde Afrika ve Afrika-Turkiye 
lliskileri (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Medya Hizmetleri, 2003). 
29 Karaca, "Turkish Foreign Policy," 117-118. 
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signed with Sierra Leone30 in 1979 constituted the beginnings of a new 
sensitivity in Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa.31 
However, lack of personnel in the MFA led to the abandonment of the 
Action Plan. 
Economic and political difficulties after 1980 military coup led Tur-
key to close its Ghana Embassy in 1981. However, there were a few more 
attempts to boost relations with sub-Saharan Africa. In January 1982, 
President of Sudan Mohammed Nimeyri visited Turkey. Tha t same 
year, Turkey's first graduate program on African Studies opened at Gazi 
University, and Turkey also signed a T E T agreement with Somalia. By 
the mid-1980s, with the impact of economic liberalization and Turkish 
Prime Minister Ozal's strong convictions about liberal economic devel-
opment and foreign policy, "activism" and "multi-faceted" foreign policy 
was once again on the agenda. While Turkey's rapid economic liberali-
zation estranged a few sub-Saharan countries,32 official economic agen-
cies like the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Treasury be-
came assets in Turkey's new foreign policy implementation mechanism. 
In 1985, the S P O started Turkey's first official development program, 
amounting to $10 million to be used for institutional capacity building 
in several sub-Saharan African countries.33 Turkey also signed coopera-
tion and T E T agreements with seven other African countries.34 
Turkey's foreign policy activism and multi-dimensionalism in the 
post-Cold War milieu was based on an understanding that Turkey's 
future with the West would rely on its relations with the non-West. 
Accordingly, the Ozal administration signed more international agree-
ments with the non-West than any other previous administration in 
Turkish history.35 Wi th respect to sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey contin-
ued to sign cooperation agreements on health, security, and culture.3 
30 Decision No. 7/18294, "TCirkiye Cumhuriyeti HUkumeti ile Sierra Leone Cumhuriyeti Hiikiimeti 
Arasmda Ekonomik veTeknik ijbirligi Anla§masi," T.C. Resmi Cazete, no. 16823, November 28,1979. 
31 Hazar, Kuresellesme Surecinde Afrika. 
32 One of these countries was Ethiopia. The Communist Derg regime in Ethiopia forced Turkey to close 
its embassy there in 1984. 
33 These countries were the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. 
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Char-
acteristics and The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect." Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ 
turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa. 
34 Turkey signed agreements with Uganda on industry, trade, agriculture and air transportation and a 
TET agreement with Nigeria in 1987, as well as TET agreements with Botswana, Chad, Djibouti, the 
Gambia, and Zambia in 1989. See T.C. Resmi Gazete, Dec. No. 87/12077, Dec. No. 90/1057, Dec. No. 
89/14552, Dec. No. 89/14402, Dec. No. 89/14701, Dec. No. 89/14527. 
35 Muhittin Ataman, "Leadership Change: Ozal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy," 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2002): 132. 
36 Cf. T.C. Resmi Gazete. For agreeements with Sudan, see Dec. No. 91/1634 on health, Dec. No. 92/3632 on 
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£ Formal bilateral visits also became more frequent in this period. Foreign 
= Affairs Minister of Cameroon Jacques Roger Booh paid a visit to Tur-
? key in August 1991. In 1993, President Ozal visited Senegal. In 1996, 
2 Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan visited Nigeria to sign a 
p trade cooperation agreement,37 and President of Kenya Daniel Arap-
£ Moi visited Turkey. Turkey opened an embassy in the Republic of South 
« Africa in 1994. 
s In the late 1990s, Turkey's frustration with the E U led to fresh recon-
z siderations of the need for a multidimensional foreign policy,38 and Afri-
ca became one of the foci of these considerations. A comprehensive plan 
was made for a more sustained effort to develop Turkey's relations with 
Africa in general, and with sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Named the 
1998 Africa Opening Action Plan, the attempt was initiated by the Un-
dersecretariat of Foreign Trade and involved multiple actors from Turk-
ish politics, diplomacy, business groups, and civil society. Nevertheless, 
due to insufficient interest in and knowledge about sub-Saharan Africa 
on the part of non-state actors, the plan received only limited input from 
wider society.39 The plan aimed to improve official Turkish representa-
tion in Africa, promote bilateral contacts, establish political consultation 
mechanisms, and provide humanitarian assistance, as well as develop 
economic and trade relations between sides.40 The plan's cultural com-
ponent was designed to introduce sub-Saharan Africa to Turkey and 
Turkey to sub-Saharan Africa.41 
The 1998 Opening Action Plan aimed to bring vitality to Turkey's 
relations with African states. However, the coalitional confrontations 
and the economic crisis of 2000-2001 pushed Turkey into a period of 
political and economic turbulence and restricted Turkish policy makers' 
capacity to implement the plan to schedule.42 Once the effects of eco-
nomic crisis began to fade and a single party (Justice and Development 
Party, or J D P ) was brought to power in the general elections of 2002, 
the plan was revisited. Wi th the support of business groups and civil 
society, "The Strategy for Developing Economic Relations with Africa" 
security, and Dec. No. 93/4783 on culture; For the TET agreement with Ethiopia, see Dec. No. 93/4974, 
with Senegal, Dec. No. 93/3963, with Ghana, Dec. No. 97/9604, and with Guinea, Dec. No. 97/9273. 
37 Dec. No. 96/8896, "Nijerya ile Turkiye Arasinda Imzalanan Ticaret Anlasmasinin Onaylanmasi 
Hakkmda Karar," T.C Resmi Cazete, no. 22855, December 22,1996. 
38 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, (RAND Corpora-
tion, 2003): 51-52. 
39 Interview with Gokhan Uskiidar, Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, January 29, 2012. 
40 Hazar, "Turkey-Africa Relations," 110. 
41 Ibid., 111. 
42 AkgOn and Ozkan, "Turkey's Opening," 533; Kemal Kirisci and Neslihan Kaptanoglu, "The Politics of 
Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle Eastern Studies 47, no. 5 (2011): 713. 
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was prepared by the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade in March 2003. 
This strategy was used by the J D P as the catalyst for the 1998 Plan.43 
Moreover, 2005 was designated "Africa-Year" in Turkey. From 2005 on-
wards, Turkey implemented its sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy with 
the increasing involvement of non-state actors. 
Post-international implementation of foreign policy 
Any study of implementation requires the researcher to look beyond 
the official decision makers and focus on the "context" or "environment" 
in which foreign policy is made.44 Categorically, the environment con-
sists of implementers, i.e. government agencies and (domestic or trans-
national) non-state actors on the one hand and targets of foreign policy, 
whose beliefs and behaviors are sought to be changed.4 In implementa-
tion studies, context is not considered as an exogenous factor against 
which actors are rendered powerless. Rather, it is defined as "other actors 
and the set of relations which they entertain."46 In the age of globali-
zation and heightened interconnectedness, foreign policy is no longer 
solely a domain of state activity and increasingly involves non-state ac-
tors. Therefore, looking at the implementation of foreign policy requires 
a relational approach, embedded in a globalization perspective. An im-
plementation approach looks at pairs or multiplicities of actors—both 
implementers and targets—in terms of their interaction and the changes 
in their level and type of interaction over time. As opposed to the hier-
archical nature of the decision-making process, implementation is based 
on coalitions.47 A decision is properly implemented only when at least 
some of the actors and agencies involved have a consensual relationship 
over a specific action to be taken, even if they do not agree on the final 
goal of the overall foreign policy. 
Post-international theory may also be useful when considering what 
this environment means from a globalization perspective and defining 
43 Alain Vicky, "La Turquie a I'assaut de I'Afrique," Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2011. Available at http:// 
www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2011/05/VICKY/20450. Although the original Africa Opening Action 
Plan had been designed by a different government, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Ciil an-
nounced that his government was determined to implement it. See his statement to the 60th Session 
of UN General Assembly Meeting, September 21, 2005, 5-6. Available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ 
ga/60/statements/tu r050921eng.pdf. 
44 Michael Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation: Problems and Approaches," British Journal of Inter-
national Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 112-128. 
45 Smith and Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, 2-6. 
46 Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill, "Implementation and Behavior," in Foreign Policy: Theories, Ac-
tors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 120. 
47 Smith and Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, 170. 
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£ major actors in the implementation. Today's polycentric world is com-
= posed of actors who are sovereignty bound (SBAs) and sovereignty free 
z (SFAs). According to Rosenau, SFAs are polities which operate in ac-
« cordance with their capability to initiate and sustain actions rather than 
p by their legal status or sovereignty, whereas SBAs rely on their formal 
£ legal status and/or sovereignty.48 Although they are formally bound by 
2 the legal authority of states, the SFAs of the multi-centric world are able 
^ to evade the constraints of states and pursue their own goals.49 Accord-
z ingly, in a fully evolved multi-centric world, SFAs and SBAs enjoy rela-
tive equality as far as initiating action is concerned. Nevertheless, both 
SBAs and SFAs require a form of cooperation with each other, main-
tained over time, to implement their policies.50 As an adaptation mecha-
nism to globalization, states are increasingly relying on cooperation with 
non-state actors.51 As governmental policies become more ambitious, 
relations between state and non-state actors become ever more crucial 
in implementing those policies. 
Central to both post-internationalism and an implementation ap-
proach is a focus on the presence or lack of cooperative behavior be-
tween SFAs and SBAs. Unlike in a state-centric world, in a multi-
centric world, the mode of such collaboration is temporary coalitions. 
Both approaches also take sequences of interactions as the units around 
which their empirical inquiries are organized.53 While rules governing 
interactions among actors are situational and mostly ad hoc, some gen-
eral patterns do emerge over repeated sequences of interactions. These 
patterns are most evident in the degree of control over foreign policy 
outcomes and the spheres of co-operative action. In the initial phase, 
SBAs have full control over the implementation process. This is due to 
the limited involvement of SFAs and the focusing of policies on spheres 
of action which are the exclusive domain of SBAs. Examples include 
signing international agreements, taking part in intergovernmental or-
ganizations, or providing troops for peacekeeping operations. In a fully 
evolved relationship, SFAs gain more autonomy and spheres of action 
expand to include areas such as humanitarian assistance and academic, 
professional, or cultural exchanges. As a result, control over foreign pol-
48 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 253. 
49 Ibid., 249 
50 Smith and Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, 171-72. 
51 James N. Rosenau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Com-
petence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change?" Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 1 (1988): 
13-44. 
52 Cohen and Kupcii, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," 36. 
53 James N. Roseanu and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 76. 
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icy outcomes become more diffuse.54 Implementation studies show that 
decision makers can influence outcomes by becoming more involved in 
the implementation process through "horizontally structured interme-
diate organizations" (HSIOs) . From a post-international perspective, 
these organizations are SBAs which are specifically designed to work 
with SFAs, have an extensive network through their branches inside and 
outside the country, and receive donations from individuals and private 
organizations. Most governmental aid and rescue agencies occupy this 
middle ground. 
Based on the above arguments, it is possible to discern four categories 
of interaction that change in terms of the actors involved, governmental 
control over outcomes, spheres of action, and timing. The first category 
comprises cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs. Cooperative 
interaction occurs when SBAs and SFAs directly cooperate in order to 
achieve a common goal. Although underlying motivations may change 
for each actor, their actions are congruent, i.e., they are in agreement 
about what needs to be done. In most cases, there is substantive SBA 
involvement, and governmental control over outcomes is high. Since it 
requires high SFA compliance, the common purpose of interaction is 
highlighted and joint SBA-SFA projects are frequent. Spheres of ac-
tion are mostly humanitarian: poverty alleviation, development, educa-
tion and health improvements, etc. Cooperative interaction mostly takes 
place in the initial stages of engagement between SBAs and SFAs. The 
second category is complementary interaction. In complementary interac-
tion, SBAs and SFAs have different goals. This interaction type requires 
more involvement by SFAs as well as H S I O s . They do not actually work 
on the same project, but coordinate their activities. The spheres of action 
mostly comprise trade and investment and transportation. There is only 
moderate SBA involvement and governmental control over outcomes, 
which last is mostly achieved through H S I O s . The third category is sup-
plementary interaction, where SFAs take on most of the responsibilities. 
There is minimal SBA involvement and control over outcomes. There 
may also be partial H S I O involvement, especially in the coordination 
of activities. The spheres of action are providing humanitarian/develop-
mental aid, establishing mechanisms of intercultural exchange, as well 
as promoting private interests. The level of supplementary interactions 
54 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 250. 
55 Smith and Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementat ion," 7. 
56 The categories are adaptations of a similar categorization by Cohen and Kupcu, "Privatizing Foreign 
Policy," 41: direct engagement between states and non-state actors; selective engagement, or episodic 
burden sharing; NSAs circumventing states; conflictual relations; and agenda setting. 
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£ increases in the later sequences of action, as SFAs gain more experience 
=> and expand their networks. 
z O n the other hand, SBAs and SFAs do not always see eye to eye on 
2 all foreign policy matters. Human rights groups, environmentalists, and 
p business circles pose certain challenges to the formal foreign policies of 
£ states. These not only take the form of discursive actions, but also in-
j ; volve foreign policy behaviors which are not in line with the official posi-
s tion of states. Moreover, as noted earlier, SFAs may also impede SBAs' 
z efforts to achieve their foreign policy goals by simply refusing to partici-
pate in foreign policy implementation. This form of conflictual interac-
tion occurs when SFAs and SBAs challenge each other's foreign policy 
goals in fundamental ways. Spheres of contention include human rights 
and democracy. Either SFAs or SBAs may ultimately prevail, depend-
ing on the resources they allocate to the issue, and the domestic and/or 
international support they receive. 
Post-international implementation of Turkey's sub-Saharan Africa policy 
a. Cooperative interaction: 
Cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs consists of implemen-
tation phases during which the Turkish government and non-state or-
ganizations directly cooperate in order to achieve common goals. Wi th 
respect to Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, the A K P 
government's goals of establishing new connections with African coun-
tries and creating new export markets correspond to the needs of small 
and medium-sized Anatolian businesses and faith-based Turkish N G O s 
endeavors to recreate links with Muslim communities in Africa. The 
collaboration is based on a convergence of goals that arise from different 
motivations. Whereas secular N G O s or government agencies employ 
a rights-based language in their actions, faith-based N G O s utilize the 
language of religious duty and obligation when explaining their involve-
ment.58 For example, the Turkish International Cooperation and Devel-
opment Agency (TIKA) provides water and sanitation services as a con-
tribution to African countries' development by preventing deaths from 
water-borne diseases, decreasing the daily burden of carrying water, and 
hence increasing the life quality of the people. As such, it is part of the 
organization's raison d'etre. For Muslim religious organizations, provid-
ing access to water is commensurate with religious duties and teachings, 
57 Zeynep Atalay, "Civil Society as Soft Power: Islamic NGOs and Turkish Foreign Policy," in Turkey Be-
tween Nationalism and Globalization, ed. Riva Kastoryano (New York: Routledge, 2013). Ozkan, "What 
Drives Turkey's Involvement in Africa?" Review of African Political Economy 37, no. 126 (2010): 533-540. 
58 Atalay, "Civil Society as Soft Power," 176-177. 
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59 II. Istanbul Conference on Somalia. Available at http://somalikonferansi.mfa.gov.tr/about.en.mfa. 




61 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries Conference, May 9-13, 2011. Avail-
able at http://www.ldc4istanbul.0rg/. 
62 NCLS "Istanbul Plan of Action for the LDCs: 2011-2020" e-Roundup, July 2011. Available at http:// 
www.un-ngls.0rg/IMC/pdf/RU_LDC-IV_final_2_.pdf. 
as cleanliness is seen as a religious duty, especially in Muslim purifica- m 
tion rituals (abdest). Similarly, for the Turkish Red Crescent, food-aid f 
programs are part of the organization's official mission to provide health 5 
to those in need. For Muslim N G O s , it is imperative that every Mus- ™ 
lim share his/her fortune with the poor by donating money for animal < 
sacrifices around the world. Therefore, although government agencies' £ 
missions are secular and Muslim N G O s are religiously inspired, there is * 
a high degree of de facto convergence between their activities. £ 
The spheres of action where most cooperative interaction takes place ™ 
are consultation, humanitarian aid, and development. In most cases, 
there is substantive governmental involvement in terms of initiative, 
funding and coordination. Accordingly, governmental control over out-
comes is high. Since cooperative interaction requires high compliance by 
SFAs, the common purpose of interaction is highlighted and joint SBA-
SFA projects are frequent. These actions involve international meetings 
about sub-Saharan Africa, development and health promotion services 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and the education of students from sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Accordingly, crisis-stricken countries which need the above 
services, such as Sudan and Somalia, become foreign policy targets in 
which cooperative engagement between SBAs and SFAs is most visible. 
To establish consultative mechanisms, the Turkish government be-
gan an initiative to address the problems in Somalia by organizing two 
international conferences in May 2010 and on May 31-June 1 2012. 
Even though the funding and logistics for these conferences were pro-
vided by the Turkish MFA, the international private sector, civil society, 
women's groups, youth, and the Somalian diaspora were all encouraged 
to discuss how a stable peace could be brought to Somalia.59 The sig-
nificance of SFA involvement was highlighted in the final declarations of 
the two conferences. In May 2011, Turkey also hosted the 4 t h United 
Nations Conference on the Least Developing Countries conference; 
again with the participation of Turkish and African business groups 
and civil society organizations. Over 400 participants from civil soci-
ety took part in discussions.62 The final declaration expressed the need 
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£ for further association between private sector and political elites to pro-
=> vide development for the least developed countries.63 In May 2012, the 
z Turkish government also organized the Turkey-Africa Media Forum 
« to increase cooperation between Turkish and African media organiza-
p tions as well as intercultural exchange between Turkey and sub-Saharan 
£ Africa. The event was a result of cooperative interaction between the 
£ Prime Ministry General Directorate of Press and Information (BYGM) 
^ and Africa Media Endeavor (AMI), a transnational N G O . 6 5 The forum 
z brought together 270 media representatives from 54 African countries, 
and led to agreement on a journalist exchange program under the aus-
pices of the BYGM and AMI . 
Regarding representation, cooperative interaction takes place be-
tween Turkey's Honorary Consuls in sub-Saharan African states and 
the Turkish MFA. According to diplomatic routine, settled or accred-
ited missions represent de facto states in a foreign land. Nevertheless, a 
given mission might occasionally not operate due to physical incapaci-
ties, such as geographical distances or international political conditions. 
In such circumstances, Honorary Consulates act on behalf of their state 
by collecting visa applications in target countries and cooperating with 
officially accredited missions in issuing them.6 6 Moreover, they also help 
to promote bilateral trade relations and cultural relations between the 
host country and the state which they represent. 
Currently, fifty-four Turkish citizens represent thirty-one sub-Sa-
haran African states in Turkey,67 and twenty-one sub-Saharan African 
citizens represent Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa. Honorary consuls 
are private individuals with personal links to foreign states. This inter-
est may be economic, cultural, or intellectual. They agree to cooperate 
with foreign states by representing them in their home countries. Mostly 
Turkish businessmen, sub-Saharan African Honorary Consuls repre-
sent states that have no settled diplomatic missions in Turkey yet, such 
as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Similarly, 
Turkey has been represented by sub-Saharan African citizens who are 
also mostly businessmen from states in which Turkey does not yet have 
63 Istanbul Declaration. Available at http://ldc4istanbul.0rg/uploads/lstanbulDeclaration.pdf. 
64 "Turk-Afrika Medya Forumu Sona Erdi," Anadolu Ajansi, May 10, 2012. Available at http://www.acunn. 
com/haber/turkiye-afrika-medya-forumu-sona-erdi/13783. 
65 African Media Initiative, http://www.africanmediainitiative.org. 
66 UlkU Ozel Akagunduz, "Prestij icin Fahri Elcilik," Aksiyon, November 14, 2005. Available at http:// 
www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-13182-34-prestij-icin-fahri-elcilik.html. 
67 Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr/fahri-konsolosluklar.tr.mfa. 
68 "TUrkiye'nin 87 Fahri Konsolosu Corevde," Anadolu Ajansi, April 8, 2010. Available at http://haber. 
mynet.com/turkiyenin-87-fahri-konsolosu-gorevde-504726-dunya/. 
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settled diplomatic missions, such as Eritrea, the Central African Repub-
lic, Benin, Botswana, Togo, Swaziland, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra 
Leone, and Congo.69 The Honorary Consuls are very significant be-
cause they are usually the initial point of contact between two countries. 
Most of time, empowering honorary consuls precedes all other official 
and private interactions between the two countries. Moreover, assign-
ing a foreign national with powers usually associated with the sovereign 
rights of a state (such as visa issuing) implies a high degree of mutual 
trust. 
The Turkish government also cooperates with SFAs to provide de-
velopment aid and health promotion services in sub-Saharan Africa. As 
the official aid agency of the Turkish government, T I K A operates as 
the intermediary organization. In 2001, T I K A was designated the sole 
coordinator of all Turkish development aid, which was previously allo-
cated in an uncoordinated manner by various Turkish SBAs.70 
In 2005, T I K A opened its first office in Ethiopia, followed by offices 
in Senegal and Sudan. In 2005, Turkey's overall official development as-
sistance to Africa was $11.8 million, comprising 1.96 percent of total 
Turkish official aid and covering five sub-Saharan African countries, in-
cluding Libya.71 From 2005 onwards, T I K A cooperated with several 
Turkish and African SFAs to allocate humanitarian assistance. By 2011, 
sub-Saharan Africa's share of Turkey's aid budget had risen to 22 per-
cent, with $131.2 million.72 
For instance, the Africa Cataract Campaign initiated by T I K A and 
the Humanitarian Relief Foundation ( I H H ) in 2007 covers ten coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2009, similar projects have been 
initiated by T I K A and several other N G O s like Doctors of Hope, 
and the Kimse Yok Mu ("Is Anybody There?") Association,75 as well 
as professional organizations like the Health Members Association 
69 Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr. Istanbul Chamber of Commerce official 
website, http://www.ito.org.tr/Dokuman/Rehberler/YurtdisiKuruluslar.pdf. 
70 Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, "Turkey's Role in the Global Development Assistance Community: 
The Case of TlKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency)," Journal of Southern 
Europe and the Balkans 10, no. 1 (2008): 93-111. 
71 Ibid.,103. 
72 TlKA Report on Development Aid 2011. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/KalkinmaYardimlariRapo ru2011.pdf. 
73 IHH, Africa Cataract Project, Sudan Country Report, June 2011. Available at http://www.ihh.org.tr/ 
uploads/2on/sudan-faaliyet-raporu-haziran-20ii.pdf. 
74 Omit Hekimleri Dernegi official website, http://www.uhder.org/default.asp?mct=detay&Topic_ 
10=62481. 
75 Kimse Yok mu? official website, http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/?p=content&gl=haberler&cl=yurtdisi 
&i=i3i6. 
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£ (SAMEDER) , 7 6 the Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Associa-
= tion (ANSEDER) , 7 7 and the Aegean Health Volunteers Association 
z (EGESADER) . 7 8 These projects have provided free health checkups, 
2 circumcisions, and cataract surgeries, as well as free medicines and medi-
p cal supplies. In December 2012, the Deva Hospital was opened in So-
£ malia through the cooperation between T I K A , the Aegean Internation-
al al Health Federation (ESAFED), and the Turkish Ministry of Health. 
3 Moreover, these health programs also cover the education of Somalian 
z doctors and nurses by T I K A and ESAFED. 7 9 
Furthermore, under its program to provide clean water, T l K A be-
gan to open water wells in Ethiopia with the cooperation of General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) . 8 0 Later in 2007, T I K A 
began to cooperate with the Istanbul Municipality (IBB) and Istanbul 
Chamber of Commerce ( ICOC) . 8 1 Cooperation between T I K A and 
SFAs continued to develop as more SFA partners like the Kimse Yok 
M u Association and I H H joined T I K A in drilling water wells in several 
sub-Saharan African states.82 This form of long term humanitarian and 
sanitary projects introduces wider segments of the two societies to each 
other and can be considered as an important point of contact between 
Turkish and sub-Saharan African people.83 
Another example of cooperative engagement is offering scholarships 
to African students. Until recently, undergraduate and graduate scholar-
ships to students from all African states have been offered by the govern-
ment agencies with limited involvement from SFAs. 6280 students from 
sub-Saharan Africa have been enrolled in Turkish universities between 
2000 and 2012.8 4 More than two thousand of these students were 
76 "Adana Sameder Uganda'da 1500 Hastayi Muayene Etti," Cihan Haber, November 28, 2011. Available 
at http://www.sondakika.com/haber-adana-sameder-uganda-da-bin-500-hastayi-muayene-3222248/. 
77 "Turk Doktorlar Moritanya'da §ifa Dagitti," Cihan Haber, December 4, 2011. Available at http://www. 
f5haber.com/novaksot/turk-doktorlar-moritanya-da-sifa-dagitti-haberi-16500/. 
78 "Izmirli Doktorlar Kamerun'a §ifa ve KardeslikCoturdil," TRT Haber, September 19, 2010. Available at 
http://www.karsiyakadh.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&.view=article&.id=9i:zmirli-doktorlar-
kameruna-ifa-ve-kardelik-goetuerdue&.catid=i:blog. 
79 "Somali'deki Deva Hastanesi Mart'ta Acihyor," Zaman Haber, December 27, 2012. Available at http:// 
www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_somalideki-deva-hastanesi-martta-aciliyor_2033900.html. 
80 TlKA Report on Development Aid 2005. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/KalkinmaYardimlariRaporu2005.pdf. 
81 TlKA Report on Development Aid 2008. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/KalkinmaYardimlariRaporu20o8.pdf. 
82 insan Hak ve Hurriyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi official website, http://issuu.com/ihhinsaniyardimvakfi/ 
docs/proje_kitabi?mode=embed. 
83 Abdirahman Ali, "Turkey's Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?" Insight Turkey 13, no. 4 
(2011): 71. 
84 Student Selection and Replacement Center (OSYM), Book of Statistics of Higher Education in Turkey. 
Available at http://osym.gov.tr/belge/1-128/sureli-yayinlar.html. 
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granted Turkish government scholarships. In 2010-2011, 390 schol 
ships were granted to sub-Saharan African students. 
ar-
Table I : Increasing percentage and diversifying states of origin of sub-Saharan African 
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Source: Student Selection and Replacement Center (0SYM), Book of Statistics of Higher Education in 
Turkey. Available at http://osym.gov.tr/belge/1-128/sureli-yayinlar.html. 
In 2012, the Directorate of Turkish Diaspora and Related Communities 
(YTB) introduced a special Turkey-Africa Scholarship Program, for 
which only African students are eligible. Turkish universities, civil soci-
ety organizations, and public bodies like the Higher Education Council 
(YOK), the Ministry of National Education (MEB), Y T B and T I K A 
work together to provide educational opportunities for sub-Saharan Af-
rican students. To publicize the scholarships, SBAs like MEB and Y T B 
worked together with SFAs, like the Yunus Emre Foundation and the 
Tiirkiye Diyanet Foundation (Foundation of Turkey's Religious Affairs), 
as well as thirteen civil society organizations, thirteen high schools, and 
two universities in fifteen sub-Saharan African countries.86 As a result, 
more than six thousand sub-Saharan African students applied for the 
scholarships. With 2,080 applicants, Ethiopia has become the country 
85 Turkiye-Afrika iliskileri. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa. 
86 Yurtd 151 Tiirkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Baskanligi (Directorate of Turkish Diaspora and Related Com-
munities), official website, "Tiirkiye Scholarships 2012-2013 Introduction, Application and Evaluation 
Presentation." Available at http://www.ytb.gov.tr/images/genel/yayinlar/kitaplar/2012_2013_Tanitim_ 
Basvuru_ve_Degerlendirme_Sunumu.pdf 
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£ with the third-most applicants, after Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over-
=> all, out of the 3,916 international students granted a scholarship, 878 
z
 are from sub-Saharan Africa. With 301 students, Somalia has been the 
2 country with most recipients. Wi th these offers, a larger number of sub-
p Saharan African students were granted scholarships. It is also important 
£ to note that the number of recipient sub-Saharan African countries also 
5 increased from 25 in 2000-2001 to 43 in the 2012-2013 academic year. 
? In its first instances, SFA-SBA engagement takes a cooperative form 
z because SFAs that are less experienced in transnational activities often 
need a SBA partner to introduce them to foreign countries and assist them 
in organizing their efforts internationally, as well as acquiring permissions 
from target countries. This has been especially true in health campaigns 
and water well projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, working in cri-
sis situations requires effective security arrangements, which can only be 
provided by traditional interstate cooperation. In subsequent campaigns, 
the SFAs take more initiative, and begin to operate more independently, as 
has been the case with Turkish humanitarian N G O s in Africa. 
b. Complementary interaction: 
Complementary interaction involves SBAs and SFAs acting in coordi-
nation or loose cooperation but to achieve independent objectives. Most 
complementary engagement involves business and trade actors who act in 
line with official foreign policy objectives but with the open intention to 
make private gain. This kind of engagement benefits SBAs and SFAs in 
different ways. While pursuing their private interests, SFAs also gain ac-
cess to host SBAs, influencing their future decisions and pressuring them 
to implement policies in due time and manner.87 SBAs, on the other hand, 
benefit from private funding and legitimize their policies and increase their 
credibility in the eyes of target countries. In complementary interaction, 
governmental control over SFAs' actions is moderate to low. Examples in-
clude official visits with mixed delegations, international conferences, and 
the operations of Turkish Airlines ( T H Y ) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Regarding official visits to sub-Saharan Africa, complementary inter-
action involves mixed delegations composed of Turkish state authorities, 
private businessmen, academics, and artists. To promote bilateral diplo-
87 Interview with Mehmet Akif Altan, the MUSiAD Bursa member, Ankara, January 10, 2013. Altan said 
that the primary consideration of businessmen participating in these international visits is to gain 
access to government officials to further their domestic business interests. An interest in doing busi-
ness in sub-Saharan Africa usually develops after the visit. In subsequent visits, they convey their 
demands to government officials, such as proper implementation of trade agreements and increased 
speed of transactions. 
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matic relations, the Turkish government has been paying regular official 
visits to sub-Saharan African states. While the primary aim of these visits 
is to sign cooperation agreements in areas such as trade, transportation, 
visa regulations, health, and tourism, an increasing number of these visits 
have also been opened to participation by SFAs such as business leaders 
and artists. In this context, whereas state authorities meet with their coun-
terparts, business leaders and artists accompanying the Turkish authori-
ties on these visits follow their own agendas. Through special programs 
designed by Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), business elites 
have been seeking ways to start, review, or develop their related invest-
ments in local markets. Academics may gain first-hand knowledge of Tur-
key s policies in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas artists increase their prestige 
and popularity as well as engage in humanitarian activities. 
A closer look at the high-level visits from Turkey to sub-Saharan Af-
rican states in 2009-2013 period shows that the number and type of ac-
companying SFAs increased. In presidential visits to Kenya and Tanzania 
in February 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Giil has been accompanied 
by SBAs such as the transportation and state ministers as well as SFAs, 
including fifty-five businessmen from the Confederation of Businessmen 
and Industrialists of Turkey ( T U S K O N ) and several journalists. In 
his visits to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon in March 
2010, the number of accompanying businessmen rose to seventy,89 while 
Presidential visits to Ghana and Gabon in March 2011 included more 
than a hundred Turkish businessmen and academics.90 
It is possible to discern a similar pattern in Prime Minister Erdogan's 
visits to sub-Saharan Africa. In his visit to Somalia on August 19, 2011, 
he was accompanied by music artists Ajda Pekkan, Nihat Dogan, Sert-
ab Erener and Muazzez Ersoy. This visit was unique since it was the 
first time the Turkish state's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa 
sought to work with Turkish artists. This interaction has led to more 
independent actions by artists about Somalia: Erener and Pekkan both 
gave concerts, income from which was donated to Somalia, whereas 
88 Correspondance with the Marmara Businessmen's Association. 
89 Kiiciik ve Orta Olcekli Sanayileri Gelistirme ve Destekleme idaresi Baskanhgi (Republic of Turkey 
Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization) official website available at, http://kos-
geb.gov.tr/Pages/UI/Haberler.aspx?ref=36. 
90 TLirkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaskanligi (Republic of Turkey Presidency) official website, available at 
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/79301/turkiyenin-afrika-acilimi-gana-ve-gabona-cumhurbaskani-
duzeyinde-ilk-ziyaret.html. 
91 "Somali'ye Sanatci ^ikarmasi," Milliyet Haber, August 19, 2011. Available at http://magazin.mil-
liyet.com.tr/somali-ye-sanatci-cikarmasi/magazin/magazindetay/19.08.2011/1428513/default. 
htm?ref=OtherNews. 
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£ Dogan declared that he would donate half the income he earned from 
= his subsequent album to Somalia.92 O n his January 2013 visits to Ga-
z
 bon, Niger, and Senegal, Erdogan invited more than 300 business 
2 leaders. It is reasonable to expect that these mixed-delegation visits will 
p continue as Turkey implements its decision to increase its trade volume 
£ with sub-Saharan Africa to $50 billion by 2015.9 4 
5 In addition to visits from Turkey, visits from sub-Saharan African of-
^ ficials to Turkey are also scenes of complementary interaction between 
z SBAs and SFAs. The MFA and the Ministry of Economy act in coor-
dination with SFAs such as DEIK, The Turkish Exporters' Assembly 
( T I M ) and T U S K O N to enable visiting sub-Saharan African states-
men and businessmen to attend multilateral business conferences, bilat-
eral trade and investment forums, and workshop breakfasts organized 
by business groups. These events are organized and funded by SFAs, but 
are also attended and supported by SBAs. For example, T U S K O N and 
T I M have organized Turkey-Africa Trade Bridges since 2006 in order 
to bring African and Turkish business and political elites together in six 
trade summits.9 5 Since 2011, more than ten bilateral trade forums have 
been organized by T U S K O N , all of which were attended by high-level 
officials from sub-Saharan African states.96 T U S K O N also cooperates 
with Turkish MPs. A recent example is the meeting organized by A K P 
Zonguldak Deputy Ercan Candan, a member of Turkey-Gambia Inter-
Parliamentary Friendship Group, which brought together T U S K O N 
businessmen and the Gambian ambassador to initiate a project to build 
and sell fishing ships to the Gambia, Mauritania, and Senegal.97 
Another form of complementary interaction takes place at interna-
tional conferences organized by Turkish SBAs and SFAs. Since 2005, 
the Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM) has been 
organizing annual Turkey-Africa Congresses where academics, experts, 
92 Kenan Ercetingoz, "Somali Sanatcilan Ne Yapacak?" August 23, 2011. Available at http://www.gecce. 
com/yazarlar/kenan-ercetingoz/somali-sanatcilari-ne-yapacak. 
93 "2013'iin Ilk Gezisi Afrika'ya," Milliyet Haber, December 28, 2012. Available at http://ekonomi.milliyet. 
com.tr/2013-un-ilk-gezisi-afrikaya/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/28.12.2012/1648012/default.htm. 
94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, "Turkey-sub-Saharan Africa Relations". Available at http:// 
www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa. 
95 The 1st Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge was held on 8th-gth of May 2006, the 2nd Turkey-Africa Bridge was 
held on i8th-igth of May 2007, the 3rd Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on I3th-i5th of May 2008, the 4th 
Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on 3rd-5th of June 2009, the 5* Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on 4th-5th 
of November 2010 and the 6th Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on 16th of December 2011 in Turkey. 
96 Turkiye Sanayiciler ve Isadamlan Konfederasyonu official website, http://www.tuskon.org/?p=content 
s&gl=faaliyetler&cl=faaliyet. 
97 "Binlerce Kisiye Is imkani," Sabah, November 12, 2012. Available at http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekono-
mi/2012/11/12/binlerce-kisiye-is-imkani. 
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and business groups meet to discuss the role of Turkey vis-a-vis the con- ™ 
temporary problems of Africa. The first of these congresses was support- -o 
ed by several SBAs, such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the 5 
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) n 
and T IKA. 9 8 The later congresses, however, were organized without the < 
direct involvement of SBAs. In addition to these congresses, T A S A M £ 
organized a Turkey-Africa Civil Society Organization Forum in August * 
2008, concurrently with the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit. This *> 
forum provided opportunities for SFAs to extend their network and ™ 
share ideas and experiences, leading to the establishment of the Interna-
tional Development and Cooperation Platform of Non-governmental 
Organizations ( U S T K l P ) . 9 9 
The African operations of T H Y can also be categorized as comple-
mentary interaction between the Turkish government and non-state ac-
tors. As the private national airline company of Turkey, T H Y has been a 
strong actor in implementing Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saha-
ra Africa by starting direct flights to several regional cities since 2006.10° 
Moreover, the company also shares the responsibility of issuing Turkish 
visas to sub-Saharan African businessmen who already have Schengen 
or U S A visas in their passports if they buy their plane tickets to Turkey 
from T H Y offices. Thus the company both promotes its business and 
coordinates with the MFA in the visa issuing process.101 
c. Supplementary interaction 
The third category of interaction between SFAs and SBAs in the im-
plementation of Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa is 
supplementary interaction. This takes place between SFAs and SBAs, 
when SFAs initiate, fund, and implement policies which are in line with 
official foreign policy. SBA involvement is mostly minimal and in the 
form of indirect support, such as providing the necessary legal and in-
98 On the other hand, the 6th Congress on December 16-18, 2010, the 7* on January 18-19, 2012, and the 
8th on April 16-17, 2013 w e r e supported by USTKlP and the Strategic Research Center. The 3rd Con-
gress, held on December 4-6, 2007, took place with the participation of state officials. 
99 USTKlP official website, http://www.ustkip.org/uyeler. 
100 Turkish Airlines' official website (www.thy.com.tr) records that the company began flights to Khar-
tum (Sudan), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Lagos (Nigeria) in 2006, Johannesburg and Cape Town 
(South Africa) in 2007, Nairobi (Kenya) and Dakar (Senegal) in 2009, Dar'as selam and Climanjaro 
(Tanzania), Entebbe (Uganda) and Accra (Ghana) in 2010, Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Douala-Yaoundi 
(Cameroon), Mombas (Kenya), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Niamey (Niger), Juba (South Sudan), Lu-
saka (Zambia), Kigali (Rwanda), Djibouti (Djibouti), Ouadagoudou (Burkina Faso) and Mogadishu 
(Somalia) in 2012. 
101 "THY Bileti Afrikah Isadamina Vize Oldu," Haberturk News Portal, February 4, 2013. Available at 
http://ekonomi.haberturk.com/is-yasam/haber/817038-thy-bileti-afrikali-isadamina-vize-oldu. 
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£ frastructural background, tax deductions or exemptions, exemption 
=> from prior fundraising permission, and Public Benefit Status.1 0 3 Among 
* the SFAs active in sub-Saharan Africa, the primary SFA recipients of 
« such support are I H H , the Kimse Yok Mu Association, the Turkish Red 
p Crescent and the Diyanet Foundation.104 Moreover, SBAs give moral 
£ support to SFAs through occasional visits and symbolic awards.105 Ac-
£ cordingly, governmental control over outcomes is low. Despite limited 
? SBA involvement, supplementary activities are mostly inspired by ear-
z lier cooperative or complementary interactions with the SBAs, as ap-
parent in their previous involvement in similar projects implemented in 
direct cooperation with governmental agencies. This is especially visible 
in spheres like humanitarian and developmental aid. 
T I K A s extension of its activities to sub-Saharan Africa began in 
2005, when it opened its first office in sub-Saharan Africa. Its activities 
are arranged in three specific development programs concerning agri-
culture, health, and professional training. These projects were initially 
implemented in cooperation with other SFAs such as the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. Incrementally, Turkish and 
sub-Saharan African SFAs have begun to cooperate with T l K A in its 
projects. As their network and know-how have improved, these SFAs 
have initiated independent humanitarian and developmental projects. 
In other words, these supplementary activities are mostly spin-offs from 
cooperative or complementary interaction between SFAs and SBAs. 
Before T l K A began its operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the ac-
tivities of SFAs were ad hoc, single country emergency aid campaigns 
in the form of supplying food, clothing and medicine, mostly at times 
of crisis or religious holidays. In 2005, development aid from SFAs to 
sub-Saharan African countries amounted to $2 million.106 In 2011, it 
rose to $120 million, making sub-Saharan Africa the focal point of all 
SFA aid.107 Traditionally, these campaigns were organized by Diyanet 
Foundation, an organization which is directly linked to an SBA, the 
102 insan Hak ve HCirriyetleri insani Yardim Vakfi official website, http://www.ihh.org.tr/tr/main/pages/ 
vergi-muaflyeti/143. 
103 Yasama Dair Association, "Cluster Analysis for Improving Co-operation between the NGOs and the 
Public Sector in Turkey," 2008. Available at http://www.yasamadair.0rg/Adminjkl/2.pdf. 
104 Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Associations, Derneklere ilijkin istatistikler. Available at 
http://www.dernekler.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&.view=category&.layout=blog&.id=5i&.lt 
emid=66&lang=tr. 
105 "Turk Okullan D15 Politikanin En Onemli Aktorii," Zaman, March 17, 2013. Available at http://www. 
zaman.com.tr/dunya_turk-okullari-dis-politikanin-en-onemli-aktoru_2066201.html. 
106 TlKA Report on Development Aid 2005. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/Kal kin maYardimlariRaporu2005.pdf. 
107 Ibid. 
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Directorate of Religious Affairs, with the cooperation of Turkish Red ™ 
Crescent and the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Manage- •>• 
ment Presidency (AFAD).1 0 8 For example, the Diyanet Foundation sent 5 
222.5 million to Somalia through a campaign it organized.109 It also n 
sent forty certified butchers to provide food to eighteen sub-Saharan < 
African states for Ramadan.1 1 0 These campaigns have generated interest £ 
among the general public, and other individuals and organizations have * 
created similar initiatives, including Ramadan campaigns by the I H H , £ 
food assistance to Somalia from the Aksaray Businessmen Associa- ™ 
tion in 2011 , 1 1 1 financial assistance from the Muhammediye Taskoprii 
Foundation112 and the Bodrum Businessmen Association.11 
Such campaigns have also evolved into more sustainable and long-
term development assistance in the form of construction and infrastruc-
ture projects. By 2011, these long term projects amounted to 60 percent 
of all SFA aid.114 For example, since 2005, I H H and Kimse Yok Mu have 
taken part in T I K A projects, such as building schools, providing medical 
check-ups, and drilling water wells. Initial cooperation with T I K A pro-
vided know-how and new networking opportunities for these SFAs and 
helped them accelerate and extend their activities. For example, accord-
ing to the I H H report "Hayat Bulan Projeler," I H H had no construc-
tion projects in sub-Saharan Africa until 2005. After 2005, the number 
of target countries increased to twelve, with more than sixty construc-
tion projects. While it has been argued that several health N G O s were 
operating in sub-Saharan Africa before 2006,1 1 5 the Goniilluler ("Vol-
108 Ibid. 




n o Tilrk Diyanet Vakfi official website, http://www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/65/guncel/diyanet-ve-vakif-per-
soneli-afrika-yollarinda. 
111 "Aksarayh Isadamlan Somali'yeve Kenya'ya Kurban Eti Dagitti," Bugiin, November 12, 2012. Available 
at http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika/aksarayli-is-adamlari-somali-ve-kenya-a-kurban-eti-dagitti-
haberi-37016. 
112 "Taskoprii Muhammediye Egitim Vakfmdan Somali'ye Para Yardimi," Haber}, August 22, 2011. Avail-
able at http://www.haber3.c0m/taskopru-muhammediye-egitim-vakfindan-somaliye-para-yardimi-
995206h.htm. 
113 "Bodrumlu isadamlan Somali'ye Para Yardimi Yapti," Cihan News Agency, September 7, 2011. Avail-
able at http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika/bodrumlu-isadamlari-somali-ye-para-yardimi-yapti-ha-
beri-28779. 
114 TiKA Report on Development Aid 2011. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/KalkinmaYardimlari Raporu2011.pdf. 
115 ihsan Comak, "Turkey's Foreign Policy to Africa and the Effect of Projects Which Were Implemented 
by Turkish NGOs Working on Health Sector in Support of TiKA, to This Policy," Avrasya Etudleri 40 
(2011-2): 201-222. 
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£ unteers") platform for professional health associations reports that the 
=> earliest project—a free circumcision and cataract operation campaign in 
z Niger— began in 2006.1 1 6 Over time, such independent initiatives began 
j ; to increase and the network of these organizations started to include oth-
p er local and international SFAs.117 These included the Zamzam Founda-
£ tion in Somalia,118 and the Qatar Red Crescent,119 who helped build a 
5 Tropical Disease Center in Somalia, as well as other Turkish SFAs like 
^ the Cansuyu Association,120 the Care Association, the Kimse Yok Mu 
z Association, the Istanbul International Brotherhood and Solidarity 
Association.122 In addition, Worldwide Doctors has initiated the "Africa 
Life Operation" project with the cooperation of the Bezm-i Alem Univer-
sity of Istanbul,123 and T I K A has initiated an agricultural development 
project in sub-Saharan Africa.124 Turkish SFAs have only recently ex-
tended their services to agricultural development in the form of building 
irrigation canals and establishing farms in the region.125 
Supplementary interaction can also emanate from private business 
interests. Complementary interactions between SBAs and SFAs have 
sparked independent interest on the part of Turkish companies towards 
Africa. Even though they work independently from the state, these 
companies have been the primary actors implementing Turkey's 2003 
Strategy for Enhancing Trade and Economic Relations with African 
Countries. In 2011, total direct investment from Turkey in sub-Saharan 
Africa has reached $191.6 million.126 For example, the V T G Hold-
ing, founded by three Turkish businessmen, operates three coal mines 
in South Africa.127 Again, another Turkish corporation called Pet Oil 
116 Gonulluler Dernegi official website, http://www.gonulluler.info/?lang=tr&sec=saglik-kamesi. 
117 iHH Website, "Hayat Bulan Projeler," October 2011, http://issuu.com/ihhinsaniyardimvakfi/docs/ 
proje_kitabi?mode=embed. 
118 Zamzam Foundation official website, http://www.zamzamsom.org/ar/downloads/newsletter_ 
march_2010.pdf. 
119 iHH official website, https://www.ihh.org.tr/somalideki-saglik-merkezimiz-hayat-kurtariyor/. 
120 Cansuyu Association official website, http://www.cansuyu.org.tr/resim/sukuyusubrosur.pdf. 
121 Kimse Yok mu? official website, http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/?p=content&gl=haberler&cl=yurtdisi 
&i=i 3 64&ay=i 2&y i 1=201 o. 
122 Istanbul International Brotherhood and Solidarity Association official website, http://www.ibs.org.tr/ 
foto/32-afri ka-su-kuyulari.html. 
123 Worldwide Doctors official website, https://yyd.org.tr/projeler/yuruyen-projeler/afrika-hayat-operas-
yonu.html. 
124 TlKA official website, http://www.tika.gov.tr/haber/afrika-kitasi-tarimla-kalkinacak/16. 
125 IHH, Humanitarian Aid Report, ]uly-August-September 2012, 39. Available at http://www.ihh.org.tr/ 
uploads/iyb/insaniya rdim-sayi50.pdf. 
126 TiKA Report on Development Aid 2011. Available at http://store.tika.gov.tr/yayinlar/kalkinma-yardi-
mi/KalkinmaYardimlariRapo ru2011.pdf. 




Ltd. will begin oil prospecting activities in Uganda pending permission 
from the Ugandan Ministry of Energy.128 Furthermore, Latek Holding, 
already a part of the Senegalese cashew nut production sector, also be-
came interested in the Kenyan construction sector.129 While Turkey's 
Giirmen Group has signed an energy delivery agreement with Ghanaian 
state,130 the Cetin Group has won the rights to operate the Internation-
al Mogadishu Airport.131 Similarly, BEKO has entered the Tanzanian * 
white goods market,132 and Florence Nightingale has decided to open a 5 
branch in Nigeria.133 African corporations have also opened some con- 5 
sultancy companies in Turkey, such as African Innovation and Develop-
ment Ankara, which promotes bilateral trade and investment between 
Turkish businessmen and those in Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Mali. This 
business interest took a more institutionalized form with joint busi-
ness councils. Turkish business councils were founded with Ethiopia in 
2008, with Kenya in 2010, with Nigeria, Tanzania, Mauritania, Ghana, 
Uganda and Angola in 2011, and with Gambia and Rwanda in 2012.1 3 4 
Moreover, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
(TOBB) and the Union of African Chamber of Commerce, Industry, 
and Agriculture Professions (UACCIAP) have met to strengthen coop-
eration and establish a Turkey-Africa Chamber.1 3 5 
The cultural sphere is the area where supplementary interaction 
in Turkish foreign policy is most visible. SFAs such as university pro-
grams and think tanks have contributed to state initiatives to provide 
an academic background on Africa. In 2006, the African Studies Center 
opened in the private Kadir Has University.136 It organizes several con-
ferences on subjects ranging from African migrants in Turkey to Turkey-
Africa relations. Similarly, in 2008, Ankara University opened the Afri-
128 "Kara Kitanm Petrol i ineTiirk Imzasi ," Sabah, December 17, 2012. Available at ht tp: / /www.sabah.com. 
tr/Ekonomi/2012/12/17/kara-kitanin-petrolune-turk-imzasi. 
129 "Senegal'in Kaju Krali Kenya'da Yapiyi Degist i rdi ," Mil l iyet, February 6, 2013. Available at h t t p : / / 
ekonomi .m i l l i ye t .com. t r / senega l - in -ka ju -k ra l i - kenya-da-yap iy i -deg is t i rd i /ekonomi /ekonomide-
tay/o6.02.20i3/ i665i57/defaul t .h tm. 
130 "Gana'nin Enerjisi Gi i rmen Grup ' tan, " Sabah, February 10, 2013. Available at ht tp: / /www.sabah.com. 
t r /Ekonomi/2013/02/ io/gananin-ener j is i -gurmen-gruptan. 
131 "Kardak Gazisi Afrika'yi Fethetti," Sabah, February 13, 2013. Available at ht tp: / /www.sabah.com.tr / 
Ekonomi/2013/02/13/kardak-gazisi-afrikayi-fethetti. 
132 "Beko Orta Afrika'ya Tanzanya'dan Gird i , " Bona Cundem, January 21, 2013. Available at h t tp : / /www. 
f5haber.com/borsagundem/beko-orta-afrika-ya-tanzanya-dan-girdi-haberi-3617893/. 
133 "Florence Nightingale Afrika'ya Giriyor," Sabah, January 26, 2013. Available at ht tp: / /www.sabah.com. 
tr/Ekonomi/2013/01/26/florence-nightingale-afrikaya-gidiyor. 
134 D15 Ekonomik iliskiler Kurulu official website, ht tp: / /www.deik.org.tr / . 
135 Akgun and Ozkan, "Turkey's Opening," 536. 
136 Kadir Has University Middle East and Africa Studies Research Center, ht tp: / /odam.khas.edu.t r / 
merkezin-misyonu.html. 
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£ can Studies Center (ACAUM). A C A U M invites professors to lecture 
=> on sub-Saharan Africa in its master's program, and past visitors include 
2 Dr. Nancy Walker and Dr. Getie Gelaye.137 It also publishes a monthly 
2 bulletin, "Afrika Giindemi" (The African Agenda), and published two 
p issues of a biannual scholarly journal, Afrika. A C A U M organizes cul-
£ tural events about African poetry, film, and literature, as well as occa-
2 sional seminars on African countries. Following ACAUM, the private 
j Izmir Economy University138 and Kirklareli University opened African 
z Studies Centers in 2009 and 2011 respectively. 
Moreover, Africa branches have been set up in established think tanks 
to specifically cover Africa. T A S A M opened its African branch in 2004, 
renamed the T A S A M Africa Institute in 2006. T A S A M has published 
regularly reports on sub-Saharan African countries (Afrika Giinlugu), 
and has organized seven Turkey-Africa Congresses since 2005. While 
the first four of these congresses were supported by SBAs, the latter 
three were more independent activities, with the participation and coop-
eration of several N G O s from African countries.139 The issues covered 
have also become more diverse; while the first congresses concentrated 
more on intergovernmental relations and organizations, later congresses 
were more focused on issues related to Africa and inter-societal coopera-
tion. Moreover, the last two congresses were organized in Sudan, and in 
Ghana.1 4 0 One of the most important consequences of these congresses 
was the formation of U S T K I P in 2008, which brought together over 
ninety SFAs from Africa as well as eighty-five from Turkey.141 Indeed, 
since 2009, U S T K I P has become the primary partner of T A S A M in 
organizing Turkey-Africa Congresses. 
Cultural interaction has not only been limited to academic initia-
tives. Civil society organizations have emerged to promote intercultural 
exchange as well as promote humanitarian projects, such as the Africa 
Brotherhood and Cooperation Association,1 founded in 2010. Along-
side the Somali aid concerts and pledges by prominent musical artists 
mentioned previously, there have been other cultural initiatives. For in-
stance, the art gallery Istanbul Modern organized an Africa Film Festi-
137 Ankara University Afrika f^alismalan Arastirma ve Uygulama Merkezi, http://www.acaum.org/arastir-
ma-egitim/konuk-ogretim-uyeleri.html. 
138 Izmir Ekonomi Universitesi Afrika C.ahsmalan Merkezi, http://www.ieu.edu.tr/tr/bylaws/type/read/ 
id/52. 
139 Turk-Asya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi, http://www.tasam.org. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Uluslararasi Sivil Toplum Kuruluslan Kalkmma ve Is Birligi Platformu, http://www.ustkip.org/index. 
php/deklarasyontr. 
142 Afrika Kardeslik ve Yardimlasma Dernegi, http:// www.afkad.org. 
M7 
val in 2012.1 4 3 Furthermore, Turkish media and private cultural institu- nj 
tions have also become more interested in sub-Saharan Africa. •<> 
m 
The Turkish education sector has not only accepted African students, £ 
but also reached out into sub-Saharan Africa by setting up private Turk- " 
ish nurseries, primary schools, colleges and, in one case, a university.145 < 
Opened by private businessmen, these schools are usually referred to as £ 
part of Islamic Gulenist movement.146 The earliest of these schools were * 
opened in countries where the Turkish government already had a pres- *> 
ence, such as Senegal, Tanzanya, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.14 ™ 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the years of opening of these schools shows 
that they were opened in three waves corresponding to Turkey's official 
declaration of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. The first wave begins in 
1998, the year of the Opening Action Plan, when Turkish schools were 
opened in five new sub-Saharan African countries. In 2003, with the in-
troduction of Turkey s Strategic Plan, Turkish schools were opened in five 
more countries. After the declaration of the Turkey-Africa Year in 2005, 
schools spread to six more countries in 2006. While Turkey's opening of 
embassies and honorary consulates often preceded the establishment of 
these schools, there are currently Turkish schools in six sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries where Turkey has no settled diplomatic mission (Rwanda, 
Malawi, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and the Central African Republic).148 Afri-
can statesmen refer to these schools as informal embassies for Turkey,149 
and praise their quality of education.1 Although these schools are run 
143 Istanbul Modern Afrika Filmleri Ciinleri, http://www.istanbulmodern.org/tr/basin/basin-bultenleri/ 
afrika_89.html. 
144 "Yedek Yasamlar," Cumhuriyet, April 9, 2012; "Memleket Meselesi," TRTGap, January 2, 2012. "Ayna" 
by Samanyolu TV, Haber Afrika Website (http://www.haberafrika.com) are examples for growing inter-
est in Turkish media about African affairs. 
145 The Nigerian-Turkish Nile University was opened in Nigeria in 2009. See official website at http:// 
www.ntnu.edu.ng. 
146 Vicky, "La Turquie a I'assaut de I'Afrique,"; Hasan Aydin "Educational Reform in Nigeria: The Case of Multi-
cultural Education for Peace, Love, and Tolerance," South African Journal of Education 33, no. 1 (2013): 1-19; 
Thomas Michel "FethullahGulenas Educator," in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement, 
ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L Esposito (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003). 
147 Turkey had opened an embassy in Tanzania in 1979, but closed it in 1985 due to economic difficulties. 
From 1998 until the opening ofTurkish embassy in 2009, there was a Turkish Honorary Consul in Dar 
es Selam. "Tanzanya'dakiTiirklerin Keyfi Yerinde," Sabah, August 24,1998. Available at http://arsiv.sa-
bah.com.tr/1998/08/24/r12.html. In Sudan, Turkey opened an embassy in 1960s, but closed it down 
in subsequent years. See, Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "Sudan Ozelinde Tiirk-Afrika lliskilerinin Bazi Yonleri." 
Available at http://www.tasamafrika.org/pdf/yayinlar/32-YFADL.pdf. 
148 There are Turkish Honorary Consulates in Togo, Benin and Central African Republic. 
149 "Turkish School like a Diplomatic Mission in Burkina Faso," Today's Zaman, November 24, 2009. 
Available http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsByld.action?load=detay&link=i 93809. 
150 "Mali Cumhurbaskanindan Turk Okullarma Ovgii: Kizim da Orada Okuyor," Zaman News, February 
27, 2009. Available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/dis-haberler_mali-cumhurbaskanindan-turk-okullar-
ina-ovgu-kizim-da-orada-okuyor_8i9955.html. 
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£ by private entrepreneurs, Turkish officials give moral support to these 
= schools through visits during their stay in sub-Saharan Africa and sym-
2 bolic support through attendance at their events. Such SBA support for 
2 these schools might have accelerated their spread into the continent. 

































First Turkish school in country 
Yavuz Selim Turkish-Senegalese College' 
Feza Boys Secondary2 
Sudanese Turkish School3 
Light Academy4 
Nigerian Turkish International College5 
Star International Primary and High School6 
Turkish Light Academy7 
Bedir High School8 
Galaxy International School9 
Complexe Scolaire International10 
College La Lumiere International" 
College Horizon12 
College Horizon International13 
College Citadelle14 
Yaounde Amity International School15 
Willow International School16 
Complexe Scolaire Bedir17 
Nejashi Ethio-Turkish International Schools18 
Burj El llm19 
International Central African Turkish School20 
L'^cole Internationale Ufuk21 
Ecole Internationale Zodiaque22 
Groupe Scolaire Jafak 
Jafak Turkish School23 
Liberian-Turkish Light International School24 
L'6cole Internationale Turco-Gabonaise25 
Colggio Esperanca Internacional26 
Yavuz Selim Educational Institutions Anatolian School27 
Horizon Schools28 
Bedir Academy29 



































1 Yavuz Selim Turkish-Senegalese College official website, http://www.gsyavuzselim.com/sn/index. jj; 
php. « 
2 Feza Boys Secondary School official website, http://www.fezaschool.org. m 
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4 Light Academy official website, http://www.lightacademy.ac.ke. _! 
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html. Q 
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14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Tiirkiye-Gine Siyasi Hifkileri." Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/rela-
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15 Yaounde Amity International School official website, http://kamedasi.neti6.net/index. 
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16 Willow International School official website, http://willow.org.mz/podium/history.php. 
17 Complexe Scolaire Bedir official website, http://www.lesahel.org/index.php?option=com_ 
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18 Nejashi Ethio-Turkish International Schools official website, http://www.nejashiturkishschools.com/ 
main.asp?ID=i&CID=6. 
19 "Moritanya'da Matematik ve Dil Olimpiyatlan," Cihan News Agency, April 11, 2011. Available at http:// 
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20 Taha Akyol, "Afrika'da Tiirk Okullan," Hurriyet, May 2, 2012. Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ 
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21 L'ecole Internationale Benin official website, http://ufukbenin.org. 
22 Ayna TV Show, Samanyolu TV, episode 150. Available at http://www.samanyolu.us/tr/vod?prg=i37. 
23 Ayna TV Show website, http://www.aynaprogrami.com/index.php?content_view=5ii&.ctgr_id=no. 
24 Liberian-Turkish Light International School official website, http://lightschool.net 
25 L'Ecole Internaitonale Turco-Gabonaise official website, http://www.etggabon.com/basarilar.html 
26 "Angola: Turkey Business people interested in Education Sector," All Africa, January 12, 2011. Available 
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30 Hope Kids Academy website, http://allafrica.com/stories/201208170105.html. 
d. Conflictual interaction 
Even though most interactions between state and non-state actors are 
harmonious, there are a few cases where SBAs and SFAs disagree on 
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£ issues regarding Turkey's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Con-
= flictual interaction occurs when either SBAs or SFAs try to limit each 
z other's room for maneuver based on divergent views about how Turkish 
£ foreign policy should be conducted. 
- The first example of conflictual interaction is related to Turkey's 
£ foreign policy in Sudan. Several SFAs challenge Turkey's official for-
5 eign policy of supporting Sudanese President Omar al-Basheer against 
s claims of genocide by the international community. Before his visits to 
z Turkey in 2008,1 5 1 an umbrella organization of Turkish human rights 
groups named the Coalition for the International Criminal Court issued 
a press release urging the Turkish government to carry out the ICC's 
arrest warrants for Ahmed Muhammed Harun (former Sudanese Min-
ister of Interior) and Ali Muhammed Ali Abdal Rahman (senior Jan-
jaweed commander) and to pressure al-Basheer. In 2009, the ICC also 
issued an arrest warrant for al-Basheer, which led to strong resistance 
from Turkish non-state actors against the Turkish government's invita-
tion for the Sudanese President to join the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) meeting.153 The Turkey-based Human Rights Agen-
da Association and Amnesty International Turkey both condemned 
the invitation of al-Basheer to Turkey. Moreover, al-Basheer's visit to 
Turkey was harshly criticized by columnists in Turkish newspapers. 
The Turkish government declared that they had no intention of ar-
resting al-Basheer. Under pressure from the international community, 
however, Turkish decision makers did decide to lower the profile of the 
subject, undertaking some "quiet diplomacy"156 which culminated in al-
Basheer's decision not to attend the O I C meeting. 
151 Coalit ion for International Criminal Court, "Basin Aciklamasi: Sudan Devlet Baskani Tiirkiye Ziyareti ." 
Available at http:/ /ucmk.org.tr / index.php?option=com_content&view=art ic le&.id=69:baslamasudan-
devlet-barkiye-ziyareti_.catid=i9:baslamalar&ltemid=6i. 
152 Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: International Criminal Court 's Decision on Bashir Arrest Warrant," 
February 3, 2010. Available at ht tp: / /www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/04/q- internat ional-cr iminal-court-
s-decision-al-bashir-s-arrest-warrant. 
153 Coalit ion for International Criminal Court website, Press Release, November 6, 2009. Available at 
http://ucmk.org.tr/ index.php?option=com_content&.view=articleStid=i57:basin-aklamasiS.catid=ig:b 
aslamalar&.l temid=6i. 
154 Human Rights Agenda Association website, Press Release, November 8, 2009. Available at h t tp : / / 
www.rightsagenda.org/index.php?option=com_content&.view=article&.id=576:ibasna-ve-kamuoyuna 
&.catid=34:takma20o8basacik&ltemid=34; Amnesty International Turkey website, "Tiirkiye Kacaklara 
Guvenli Bir Siginak Saglamamah." Available at http:/ /www.amnesty.org.tr/ai/node/1105. 
155 Joost Lagendijk, "El-Besir Davet Edi lmemeli , Tutuklanmah," Radikal, November 8, 2009. Avail-
able at http:/ /www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ joost_lagendijk/el_besir_davet_edi lmemeli_tutuklanma-
li-963290. 
156 Birol Gi iven and MehmetOzkan , "Why Welcome Al Basheer?Contextual izingTurkey's Darfur Policy," 
Seta Policy Brief 45 (July, 2010): 10-12. 
15' 
A second example of conflictual interaction between SBAs and ™ 
SFAs can be observed with respect to Turkish foreign policy on Soma- -D 
lia. O n July 27, 2013, the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was bombed 5 
by the Al-Shabaab radical Islamist terrorist group, killing one Turkish " 
Special Forces officer and injuring three others. Al-Shabaab argued < 
that the Turkish government was intervening in Somalia's affairs and £ 
"bolstering] the apostate regime and a t tempt ing] to suppress the es- * 
tablishment of Islamic Shari'ah." The group also accused Turkish of- £ 
ficials of plotting against Somali people and "attacking] the home of ™ 
the Muslims."157 The Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil (Jicek argued 
that the attack was directly aimed at disrupting Turkey's humanitarian 
actions in Somalia,158 while the Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag 
stated that Al Shabab could not stop Turkey's actions. Nevertheless, the 
attack led to increased security measures, which implies that Turkey's 
foreign policy implementation in Somali has become even more chal-
lenging.159 From a theoretical point of view, the attack was important 
since it arose not between state and non-state actors in Turkey, but be-
tween the Turkish state and a Somalian non-state actor. 
There are also instances where SBAs try to impede SFAs activities 
concerning Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan African countries and 
citizens. The academic journal Afrika published by AQAUM was sus-
pended by the Ankara University administration in early 2013, amid 
allegations of government pressure.160 The third issue of the journal had 
been dedicated to Turkey's policy towards African immigrants and refu-
gees. It has been argued that a case study criticizing Turkey's handling of 
Nigerian citizen Festus Okey's death in a police station was the catalyst 
for the administration's attempts to censor the journal and its subse-
quent suspension. In response, AQAUM researchers protested the 
general inclination to see research centers as units existing to reproduce 
the views of the bureaucracy, arguing that academics should contend 
with those colleagues who operate within the confines of a bureaucratic 
157 "Somalis Shocked by Al-Shabaab Attack on Turkish 'Muslim Brothers,'" Sabahi Online, July 29, 2013. 
Available at http://sabahionline.com/en_CB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/07/29/feature-01. 
158 "'Somalia Attack Shows that Turkey Stepped On Someone's Foot': Parliament Speaker-Cicek," Hur-
riyet Daily News, July 29, 2013. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/somalia-attack-shows-
that-turkey-stepped-on-someones-foot-parliament-speaker-cicek.aspx?pagelD=238&.nlD=5i662_.Ne 
wsCatlD=338. 
159 Fikret Bila, "Yozgat'a Cider gibi Somali'ye Gidiyorum," Milliyet, August 2, 2013. Available at "http:// 
siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-yozgat-a-gider-gibi-somali-ye/siyaset/ydetay/1744839/default.htm. 
160 Baskm Oran "Boyle iktidara Boyle Universite," Radikal 2, December 23, 2012. Available at http://www. 
radikal.com.tr/radikal2/boyle_iktidara_boyle_universite-1113369. 
161 "Ankara Universitesi'nde Afrika Sansiiru," CNN Turk, November 21, 2012. Available at https://www. 
cnnturk.com/2012/guncel/11 /2i/ankara.universitesinde.afrika.sansuru/68550o.o/index.html. 
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£ mindset. Unlike in the first two cases, here it was the state actor that 
= intervened to impede the activities of the non-state actor. 
z
 The conflictual cases between state and non-state actors in Turkish 
o 
E foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa have two implications: Contro-
p versy over Al Basher and the Somalia attack show that Turkish opening 
£ up to sub-Saharan Africa has not been received positively by all and that 
2 Turkish and African non-state actors are able to make it difficult for 
s Turkey to implement its foreign policy. T h e Afrika journal incident, on 
z the other hand, demonstrates that the government, relying on its legal 
and institutional prerogatives, can still impede the actions of non-state 
actors whenever these actions are deemed detrimental to the implemen-
tation of its sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy. 
Conclusion 
Despite an early call to redirect some of the attention from decision mak-
ing to the implementation process where foreign policy is enacted, there 
are still few studies that focus on foreign policy implementation.162 In this 
study, we attempted to redress this lack of emphasis by concentrating on 
Turkeys implementation of its sub-Saharan African foreign policy. Em-
ploying a post-international perspective, we analyzed the interaction of 
SBAs and SFAs in various spheres and observed that SFAs take on more 
responsibilities as the relations with the foreign policy target intensify. 
Apart from taking foreign policy decisions, SBAs set the rules by 
signing trade, visa, and transportation agreements with target actors, 
providing a suitable background for intensified relations. They also 
sometimes provide SFAs with public funds and expertise. Nevertheless, 
in the later phases of implementation, SFAs become more self-reliant 
and taken more initiative. Because of increased know-how and extended 
transnational networks, Turkish SFAs have become increasingly proac-
tive, covering more elusive spheres like intercultural exchange. Such pro-
active and independent behavior seems to be a spin-off from previous 
experience in collaborative projects between SFAs and SBAs. The SFAs 
which had more experience in collaborating with the SBAs also became 
more active in taking initiative in the later periods compared to other 
SFAs with less collaborative experience. 
Our findings support the post-international argument that SFAs, 
with their non-hierarchical and less bureaucratic organization, are more 
adaptable to different circumstances and more efficient in utilizing new 
technologies, leading to an increase in their overall involvement in for-
162 Brighi and Hill, "Implementation and Behavior." 
'53 
eign policy. Nevertheless, greater collaboration with SBAs increased « 
their access to target countries and helped them to broaden their range •= 
of activities. If the trend continues, it is reasonable to expect that Turk- 5 
ish SBAs will become more dependent on SFAs as the breadth of issues n 
covered and their efficiency and flexibility increase in the coming years. < 
O n the other hand, conflictual interactions are also more probable than £ 
ever as the consequences of Turkey's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Af- * 
rica become more visible and available to scrunity by wider domestic and » 
international publics. ™ 
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